The Middle East in Global Strategy by unknow

Author:unknow
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Middle Eastern, Social Science, Political Science, World, Regional Studies
ISBN: 9781000303377
Google: 0yCwDwAAQBAJ
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2019-09-10T11:12:31+00:00

Egypt, Syria, and the Yom Kippur War

Judging by the heroic rhetoric of President Sadat of Egypt, the Yom Kippur war was the Arabs' finest hour. After decades of fratricidal divisions and humiliating defeats, the Arabs at last pulled themselves together, prepared meticulously for the war, and were quite successful in achieving their objectives. The seemingly impregnable Bar-Lev Line, that symbol of Israeli superiority, proved to have been a myth. Egypt regained by force of arms what it had lost by force of arms only six years earlier.

The view from Damascus of the same war was very different, however. Syria, like Egypt, launched the war in the most favorable conditions. Its soldiers fought just as bravely as their Egyptian allies. Its losses on the battlefield were just as heavy as those of Egypt. Yet, by the end of the war, Syria had far less to show for it. Indeed, not only did Syria fail in its attempt to recapture at least parts of the Golan but by the end of the war the Ba'th republic had lost additional territory.22

What clearly made the Syrians very bitter--and not without justification--was the betrayal by their allies. Egypt needed Syria in the war as a grand decoy that would commit substantial Israeli forces to a distant second front and thus ease the Egyptian attempt to cross the Suez Canal. Whether the Syrians were really eager to engage the Israelis is a moot point. Ultimately, as soon as Sadat pressed them to go to war, they could not really afford to turn him down. For if Assad had declined an Egyptian request for a joint war effort, he would have exposed his regime to charges of insincerity. Having led the radical wing of the Arab camp, having in fact drawn Egypt into the Six Day war, Syria could not afford to flinch when Egypt requested assistance in the struggle to liberate lost Arab lands (including Syrian territories). Hence, even if Assad had been aware of the degree to which he was being used by Egypt, he had no alternative but to go along with Sadat, put on a brave face, and try to make the best of it from the Syrian point of view.23

But this was easier said than done. Indeed, the degree to which Syria could ensure adequate payoffs from this alliance hinged partly on Israel's counterstrategy in the Yom Kippur war. The latter (1) could have contained Syria and focused on repelling the Egyptians from die east bank of the Suez Canal; (2) it could have contained Egypt and concentrated on the Syrian forces in the Golan; (3) it could have settled for containment on both fronts and permitted both Egypt and Syria to retain their initial gains; or, finally, (4) it could have fought both countries with the intention of denying diem any territorial gains.

The fact that Israel chose the second alternative immediately subjected the Egyptian-Syrian alliance to enormous strains. With three Israeli armored divisions pressing them, the Syrian forces could not protect their gains or even deny Israel new gains.

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